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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Setting the stage 
Interest in Third-Party Litigation Financing (“TPLF”) resurged 
recently with the highly public lawsuit between Gawker Media, LLC 
(“Gawker”) and Terry Bollea (more commonly known by his ring name 
“Hulk Hogan”). 1  The world of litigation financing has also become 
increasingly ridiculed on the heels of Peter Thiel’s admitted financing of 
Hulk Hogan’s takedown of Gawker.  Indeed, it was discovered that Thiel 
was financing not just the Hogan lawsuit, but actually funded, or sought 
to fund, other suits against Gawker as well.2  Thiel’s message and the 
media’s understandable takeaway was heard loud and clear: those who 
have scrapped with the world’s billionaires should take notice. 
But the world of litigation financing—considered something of a 
final frontier for lucrative investment3—could be shut down as quickly 
as it is drawing attention.  No doubt as Gawker enters Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, businesses nationwide have likely taken notice of the 
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Editor-in-Chief of Transactions: The Tennessee Journal of Business Law, is in the Class of 
2017 at The University of Tennessee College of Law. All opinions expressed herein are 
solely attributed to the authors and not to their respective institutions or employers. 
The authors would also like to thank Professor George W. Kuney for his wisdom and 
assistance in finalizing this piece. 
1 See generally Bollea v. Gawker Media LLC, No. 12-012446-CI (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., Jun. 
7, 2016); L. Gordon Crovitz, Peter Thiel’s Legal Smackdown, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2016, at 
A15.  
2  Matthew Ingram, Gawker Bankruptcy Filing Means Peter Thiel Has Already Won, 
FORTUNE, June 10, 2016, http://fortune.com/2016/06/10/gawker-bankruptcy-thiel/. 
3 See Sara Randazzo, Litigation Financing Attracts New Set of Investors, WALL ST. J., May 15, 
2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/litigation-financing-attracts-new-set-of-investors-
1463348262. 
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vulnerability proposed by the right litigation financed by the right 
billionaire with a grudge.  Will this prove to be a watershed moment that 
spurs new regulation, or will it be the first blood in a new world of so-
called “perfect enforcement” in which all law breaking must be 
accounted for?  Make no mistake, the Thiel-Gawker battle could mark 
the closing of investment’s final frontier, but it is just as likely to begin a 
new era of perfect civil enforcement.4 
The concept of perfect enforcement of laws is not new.  Over 
the past several years, the world has become increasingly familiar with 
examples of perfect law enforcing technologies, such as red-light 
cameras.5  Such monitoring technologies are praised for being “more 
accurate and less costly” but faulted for being more invasive and 
“downright uncomfortable” to encounter. 6  These technologies are a 
particular kind of enforcement: they “perfectly enforce” infractions by 
way of operating under continuous surveillance or “perfect 
surveillance.”7  The act of perfect surveillance does not seek to prevent 
or interfere with your violation of law; rather, the surveillance “would 
detect every instance of its violation.”8  
Of course, the best part about these technologies is that they are 
not universal perfect enforcement—that is, they do not yet exist 
everywhere and certainly do not detect any violation of law in any form.  
Another advantage is that they do not hold grudges because a system of 
universal and perfect enforcement would paralyze all actors.  For 
example, even the youngest of generations would be guilty of such 
4  “Perfect” law enforcement has previously been discussed in conjunction with 
technology such as a stoplight and other traffic cameras. See generally Christina M. 
Mulligan, Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to Limit and When to Use Technology, 14 RICH. 
J.L. & TECH. 13 (2008). But we envision that sufficient third-party financing of lawsuits 
could hypothetically carry any civil lawsuit to trial. We refer to this idea as the concept 
of “perfect civil enforcement.” Peter Thiel’s funding of Hogan’s case demonstrates 
what could be the first of a new trend in attempted perfect civil enforcement of a civil 
infraction that, without a grudge-holding financier, would not have been carried to its 
full term. 
5 See generally id.  
6 Id. at 2. 
7 Id. at 3. 
8 Id. at 3. 
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infractions as common as speeding, consuming alcohol, pirating media, 
or smoking.9  Atonement for these common and frequent infractions 
would become every man’s problem, but what if the machinery for 
perfect enforcement was owned by the wealthy—by the people with the 
cash to make anyone pay—financially, socially, etc.—for their 
infractions? What if any of your violations of law—any simple tort for 
instance—was almost certain to be enforced to the fullest extent of the 
law?  Moreover, what if that enforcement would be financed purely in the 
hopes of a grand payout for the investors? 
After the Thiel-Hogan-Gawker take-down, we could be entering 
a new age of litigation financing that could amount to perfect civil 
enforcement of law. Although the wealthy have always been able to carry 
out a grudge by funding a lawsuit to the point of breaking an enemy, the 
potential (and the incentive) for investors to finance a party’s litigation 
through trial in the hopes of a payout has far greater consequences for 
the actions and risks that we choose to take under the law. 
This article will briefly introduce the reader to the history and 
modern world of litigation financing before analyzing the effect that a 
billionaire-financed lawsuit, such as Bollea v. Gawker, may have on the 
burgeoning concept of perfect enforcement of civil laws. The article will 
also propose policy considerations to curb the unwanted effects, if any, 
of these lawsuits and to address related professional ethics concerns. 
B. Bollea v. Gawker Media 
On or about October 4, 2012, Gawker posted a written report 
(including excerpts of the videotaped sexual encounter) about an 
extramarital affair between Hulk Hogan and a woman, both of whom 
were married at the time. 10  In a somewhat complex set of cases, Hulk 
Hogan sued Gawker in Florida state court asserting claims for invasion 
of privacy, publication of private facts, violation of the right of publicity, 
and infliction of emotional distress.11  Additionally, Hulk Hogan filed a 
9 Id. at 5. 
10 Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So.3d 1196, 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
11 Id.  
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motion for temporary injunction seeking to enjoin Gawker from 
publishing and otherwise distributing the video excerpts and the written 
report.12  In March 2016, a Florida jury awarded Hogan a total of $140.1 
million in compensatory and punitive damages.13  Gawker’s motions for 
a new trial and reduced damages were denied on May 201614, and on 
June 10, 2016, Gawker filed a notice of appeal.15 
After news broke that Peter Thiel financially supported Hogan in 
the litigation, Gawker sought leave from the court to pursue limited 
discovery on the matter.16  The judge did not rule definitively absent a 
formal motion, but the judge responded negatively saying, “I don’t like 
looking at all the stuff that’s published out there . . . It’s not healthy.”17  
As this case progresses through the appeals process, all eyes will be on 
how high the appeals go and how strictly the courts decide to scrutinize 
Thiel’s involvement as well as other issues, such as First Amendment 
concerns.18 
12 Id. at 1199. 
13  Debra Cassens Weiss, Will $140M Verdict for Hulk Hogan in Sex-Tape Case Survive 
Appeal?, ABA JOURNAL (Mar, 21, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article 
/will_115m_verdict_for_ hulk_hogan_in_sex_tape_case_survive_appeal (stating that 
award included $55 million for economic injuries, $60 million for emotional distress, 
and $25 million in punitive damages) (citations omitted). 
14 Kat Sieniuc, Gawker Can’t Release More Hulk Hogan Sex Tape Footage, LAW360 (June 8, 
2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/805073/gawker-can-t-release-more-hulk-
hogan-sex-tape-footage. 
15 See Gawker Media, LLC et al., v. Terry Gene Bollea, No. 2D16-2535, (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App.  Jun. 10, 2016) (WestLaw). 
16 Eriq Gardner, Judge Upholds Hulk Hogan’s $140 Million Trial Victory Against Gawker, 
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, May 25, 2016, 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/judge-upholds-hulk-hogans-140-897301 
(detailing Gawker counsel’s request at the May 25th, 2016 hearing on a motion to 
dismiss and a motion for new trial). 
17 Id. 
18  Amy Gajda, Privacy vs. Press, SLATE (March 21, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/03/what_migh
t_happen_if_the_hogan_gawker_case_reaches_the_supreme_court.html (stating “The 
Hulk Hogan case could force the Supreme Court to finally draw the line between press 
freedom and privacy. The press might not like it.”). 
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The details of Mr. Thiel’s financial involvement remain largely 
unclear. Mr. Thiel’s scant comments indicate that he spent roughly $10 
million dollars to hire a team of lawyers to seek out plaintiffs and initiate 
suits against Gawker on their behalf.19  Hulk Hogan’s case, then, is one 
of many suits brought against Gawker at the behest of Mr. Thiel 
although Mr. Thiel would not speak to other cases.20  Mr. Thiel’s animus 
towards Gawker stems from a 2007 article published by the media site in 
which Thiel was outed as gay.21  It is also unclear how long Mr. Thiel has 
been pursuing litigation against Gawker. 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF LITIGATION FINANCING 
The history of litigation financing intertwines with the doctrines 
of maintenance, champerty, and barratry. 22   Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines maintenance as “[i]mproper assistance in prosecuting or 
defending a lawsuit given to a litigant by someone who has no bona fide 
interest in the case; meddling in someone else’s litigation.”23  Champerty 
is “[a]n agreement to divide litigation proceeds between the owner of the 
litigated claim and a party unrelated to the lawsuit who supports or helps 
enforce the claim.” 24   Barratry means “[v]exatious incitement to 
litigation, [especially] by soliciting potential legal clients” and specifically 
refers to inciting baseless litigation.25  While barratry remains barred via 
professional ethics rules and various statutes against frivolous litigation,26 
19 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel, Tech Billionaire, Reveals Secret War With Gawker, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 25, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/business 
/dealbook/peter-thiel-tech-billionaire-reveals-secret-war-with-gawker.html?hp&action 
=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=second-column-
region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business Opportunity?, 
30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 485 (1992). 
23 Maintenance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See generally Nicholas Dietsch, Litigation Financing in the U.S., the U.K., and Australia: 
How the Industry has Evolved in Three Countries, 38 N. KY. L. REV. 687 (2011) (giving  
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prohibitions on maintenance and champerty have gradually eroded in the 
United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States.  
The doctrines of maintenance and champerty grew out of a belief 
that only the courts and the litigants ought to be involved in the judicial 
process. 27   Some scholars trace the existence of the doctrines of 
maintenance and champerty back to ancient Greece and Rome. 28   
During the Middle Ages in England, prohibitions on maintenance and 
champerty arose in response to feudal lords providing maintenance for 
suits involving their retainers, regardless of the suit’s merits. 29   The 
English Parliament enacted various statutes prohibiting the practice 
between 1275 and 1540, and it remained a tort and a crime until 1967.30  
From 1967 till 1990, maintenance and champerty agreements were 
unenforceable as against public policy.31  Further, up until 1990, the U.K. 
traditionally barred contingency fee arrangements between a lawyer and a 
client for the same reasons as the bar on maintenance and champerty.32  
However, in 1990, the English Parliament passed the Courts and Legal 
Services Act, which made conditional fee agreements legal,33 and since 
1998, contingency fees have been permitted in all civil actions except 
family law matters. 34   English courts embraced the loosening of 
champerty and maintenance restrictions by reasoning that the 
prohibition arising from public policy concerns must also evolve with 
background for the historical development of the litigation financing industry in the 
three countries). 
27 Martin, supra note 22, at 487. 
28 Id. at 486-87 (stating that “The Greeks and Romans assumed that if one maintained 
an action on behalf of another, the action was either completely unfounded or too 
trifling to be undertaken for any purpose other than harassing the defendant.”) 
(citations omitted). 
29 Id. at 487. 
30 Id. 
31 Id.; Dietsch, supra note 26, at 699. 
32 Dietsch, supra note 26, at 698. 
33 Id. at 698-99. 
34  Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs’ Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and Legal) 
Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 57, 73 (2000). 
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changes in views of public policy.35  Treatment of champerty restrictions 
was highly discretionary and uncertain in England until Court of Appeal in 
Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd. in 2005.36  In that case, the Court of Appeal 
held that third-party funding is acceptable so long as the funder does not 
control litigation decisions.37  
Much like the U.K. and U.S., Australia historically prohibited 
third-party litigation financing.38  Acceptance in Australia of third-party 
litigation funding began in their bankruptcy courts and gradually spread 
to general civil litigation.39  Australian courts have even gone as far as to 
permit third-party funders to have broad powers to control the 
litigation.40 
The United States shared the historical ban on champerty and 
maintenance with the U.K. and Australia, manifested in common law, 
statutory law, and public policy.41  The reasoning behind the prohibition 
in the U.S. was the same as those in the U.K. and Australia: 
encouragement of frivolous litigation, harassment of defendants, 
increased damages, and resistance to settlements. 42   However, the 
historical prohibition received its first exception in 1908 when the 
American Bar Association began allowing attorneys to collect 
contingency fees.43  
35 Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 1268, 1280-81 (2011). 
36 Id. at 1281. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 1279. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. (citing Campbells Cash and Carry Pty. Ltd. v. Fostif Pty. Ltd. (2006) 229 CLR 386 
(Austl.) and Mobil Oil Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Trendlen Pty. Ltd. (2006) 229 ALR 51 
(Austl.)). 
41 Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL 
BUS. & COM. L.J. 85, 87 (2002). 
42 Steinitz, supra note 35, at 1279.  
43 Andrew Hananel & David Staubitz, The Ethics of Law Loans in the Post-Rancman Era, 17 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 795, 797-98 (2004).  
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Carl E. Persons made the first attempt at bona fide litigation 
financing in 1976 when he attempted to raise funds for antitrust 
litigation by selling shares of stock in the suit’s outcome.44  Although 
Persons’s attempt failed, others caught on to the idea, so the industry 
began to develop in the late 1980s and early 1990s.45  Reactions from the 
states have been mixed, with some states like Ohio relying on the 
doctrines of maintenance and champerty to invalidate litigation financing 
agreements with third-parties.46  Other states, like Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, and Arizona, have been largely receptive to the practice and have 
refused to enforce the doctrine of champerty. 47  Accepting litigation 
finance is still relatively unresolved and developing, and some states, 
such as Tennessee, have began passing statutes to better regulate the 
industry.48 
III. MODERN LITIGATION FINANCING 
General justifications for permitting third-party litigation 
financing include: improved access to justice given the high cost of 
modern litigation 49 and that other forms of financial risk sharing are 
44 Yifat Shaltiel & John Cofresi, Litigation Lending for Personal Needs Act: A Regulatory 
Framework to Legitimatize Third Party Litigation Finance, 58 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 347, 
347 (2004). 
45 Id. 
46 Dietsch, supra note 26, at 696. 
47 Id. at 694. 
48 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-16-101 (West 2014) (short title for the section is the 
“Tennessee Litigation Financing Consumer Protection Act”); see also Heather Morton, 
Litigation or Lawsuit Funding Transactions 2015 Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-
and-commerce/litigation-or-lawsuit-funding-transactions-2015-legislation.aspx (last 
visited July 24, 2016) (providing an overview of all state level litigation financing 
legislation as of January 2016). 
49 See generally Sasha Nichols, Access to Cash, Access to Court: Unlocking the Courtroom Doors 
with Third-Party Litigation Finance, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 197 (2015). 
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already in use such as contingency fee arrangements, 50  law suit 
syndication,51 pre-settlement funding,52 and public interest litigation.53  
Critics of third-party litigation financing bring two general 
categories of argument: historical-consequential and ethical.54  Historical 
arguments revolve around the doctrines of maintenance and champerty 
and share the same concerns as those two doctrines.55  Historical critics 
argue that third-party litigation financing will encourage frivolous 
lawsuits and at the same time discourage settlements. 56   Similarly, 
consequentialist critics argue that litigation financing will generally cause 
an increase in litigation, 57  it will encourage frivolous or speculative 
litigation, and that third-party litigation funders are “tilting the scales of 
justice in favor of plaintiffs at the expense of defendants.”58  Ethical 
critics argue that pre-funding evaluations may destroy attorney-client 
privilege,59 the arrangements violate the prohibition of lawyers sharing 
fees with non-lawyers, 60  plaintiffs are victimized usurious loan 
50  Hananel & Staubitz, supra note 43, at 797-98 (stating that contingency fee 
arrangements have been allowed in the US since 1908).  
51  Martin, supra note 22, at 498 (stating that law suit syndication began to rise in 
prominence in the 1980’s). 
52 Id. (stating that pre-settlement funding has been in practice since the 1980’s as well); 
Jason Lyon, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 571, 573-74 (2010). 
53 Martin, supra note 22, at 491-92. 
54 See generally Lyon, supra note 52. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 590. 
58  See Joshua Richey, Tilted Scales of Justice? The Consequences of Third-Party Financing of 
American Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 489 (2013). 
59  Ani-Rae Lovell, Protecting Privilege: How Alternative Litigation Finance Supports an 
Attorney’s Role, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 703 (2015). 
60 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4; Martin, supra note 22, at 495; Matthew 
Bogdan, The Decisionmaking Process of Funders, Attorneys, and Claimholders, 102 GEO. L.J. 
197, 207 (2014).  
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arrangements, 61  and financiers may influence the decision making 
process of litigants and lawyers. 62   Many of these critiques have 
engendered hot debates, but of particular concern with respect to the 
Theil-Gawker-Hogan throw down are the frivolous litigation and 
resistance to settlement critiques. 
The litigation financier’s profit motive serves as the main rebuttal 
for concerns about frivolous lawsuits and resistance to settlement.  Much 
like an attorney using contingency fee arrangements, a third-party 
litigation financier has an incentive to not finance frivolous or 
speculative litigation.  If a financier backed a dubious case, he or she is 
likely to lose their money.  Because the financier has nothing at stake in 
the litigation but their investment and the financing is typically non-
recourse, profit motive incentivizes the careful selection of only 
meritorious cases.  This, in fact, has been the case at the highest levels of 
litigation finance.63  At the lower levels involving small claims, the merit 
of financed cases is much less clear.64  Regardless of the sophistication of 
the analysis of a plaintiff’s claim, if a lender has a profit motive, then that 
profit motive incentivizes funding of meritorious claims over funding 
frivolous claims.  
IV. LITIGATION WITHOUT PROFIT MOTIVE 
What if a litigation financier does not have a profit motive?  
Does the financier even engage in litigation financing, or is it something 
different?  In the media frenzy that followed news of Thiel’s 
involvement with the Gawker case, attention immediately turned to the 
61 Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime Industry That Has a Place in the 
United States Market, 53 VILLANOVA L. REV. 83, 92 (2008). 
62 Steinitz, supra note 35, at 1299. 
63 For example, Bentham IMF boasts a “90% success rate.”  However, that does not 
include “withdrawals.” Their record is composed of 119 settlements, 13 cases won, 13 
cases lost, and 35 “withdrawals.” See Our Track Record, BENTHAM IMF, 
https://www.benthamimf.com/about-us/bentham-imf (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
64 John P. Barylick & Jenna Wims Hashway, Litigation Financing: Preying on Plaintiffs, 59 R. 
I. BAR J. 5, 7 (2011) (stating that lenders evaluate a plaintiff’s case “by assessing: the 
presence of a skilled plaintiff’s attorney; the defendant’s potential liability; in car 
accident cases, the extent of damage to the vehicle; bright blood injuries; medical bills; 
and a proprietary statistical analysis of jury verdicts in comparable cases.”) (citations 
omitted). 
                                                        
2016]      LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE WAKE OF GAWKER MEDIA V. BOLLEA     179  
litigation financing industry. 65   However, the specific financial 
arrangements of Thiel, a Stanford-educated attorney, are far from clear.66  
On one hand, Thiel stated, “I would underscore that I don’t expect to 
make any money from this. This is not a business venture.”67  On the 
other hand, he also said, “[w]e would get in touch with plaintiffs who 
otherwise would have accepted a pittance for a settlement, and they were 
obviously quite happy to have this sort of support . . . . In a way very 
similar to how a plaintiff’s lawyer on contingency would do it.” 68   
Regardless of whether Thiel is covering his costs with the damage 
awards or just pouring money into the effort with zero expectation of a 
return, he is still operating without a profit motive. 
Categorizing Thiel’s involvement with Gawker as “litigation 
financing” has important implications for the justification of the 
industry.  As previously discussed, litigation financing firms’ profit 
motive rebuts concerns with potentially frivolous litigation and resistance 
to settlement – the motivation to reap a profit incentivizes firms to 
pursue meritorious litigation and to balance the costs associated with 
rejecting a settlement offer in favor of prolonging litigation.  Where that 
profit motive is absent, the justification falls apart.  Thiel himself stated 
that his purpose was to seek out plaintiffs who had claims against 
Gawker69 and enable those plaintiffs to reject low settlement offers.70 
Other protections against frivolous or unfounded litigation exist 
such as Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,71 28 U.S.C. 
65 Sorkin, supra note 19.    
66  Executive Profile: Peter Andreas Thiel J.D., BLOOMBERG, Aug. 2, 2016, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=161959&
privcapId=43580005 (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
67 Sorkin, supra note 19.    
68 Id. 
69 Id. (“He funded a team of lawyers to find and help ‘victims’ of the company’s 
coverage mount cases against Gawker.”). 
70 Id. (“We would get in touch with plaintiffs who otherwise would have accepted a 
pittance for a settlement . . . .”). 
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (2016).  
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§ 1927,72 § 110 of the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers,73 and 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.74  How often those 
mechanisms of enforcement are actually used in practice is an entirely 
different question that is beyond this article’s scope.  For the purpose of 
this piece, we will assume that all litigation being brought has some basis 
that will render it non-frivolous.75  
While much of the journalistic uproar can most likely be 
attributed to the subject matter of the lawsuit, 76  the significance of 
Thiel’s involvement extends beyond First Amendment concerns.  In the 
abstract: 1) an agent; 2) with significant financial resources;77 3) spent a 
large sum of their own money;78 4) to hire a team of lawyers to seek out 
strangers with valid claims against an entity;79 5) that the agent sought to 
influence.80  The key aspect of this situation is the abstraction of the 
motive.  With traditional third-party litigation finance (or with lawyers 
acting on contingency fees for that matter), the party assuming the 
72 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 
73 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 (2000). 
74  FED. R. CIV. P. 11.; see Erin Schiller & Jeffrey A. Wertkin, Frivolous Filings and 
Vexatious Litigation, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 909, 909 (2001). 
75 There are several reasons why this assumption is helpful, including the illustration 
that there is cause for concern outside of frivolous litigation and assumes away the 
possibility that lawyers or law firms would refuse to participate in bringing suit for fear 
of court-imposed penalties. 
76 Journalists and media outlets have an interest in being outraged over other journalists 
and media companies getting sued for what they have published. See, e.g., Mark Joseph 
Stern, Peter Thiel Is Wrong About the First Amendment, SLATE (May 26, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/05/should_pet
er_thiel_be_allowed_to_finance_hulk_hogan_s_lawsuit.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
77 As of July 22, 2016, Thiel’s personal net worth was estimated to be $2.7 billion. The 
Midas List, #10 Peter Thiel, FORBES, July 22, 2016, http://www.forbes.com 
/profile/peter-thiel/. 
78 Sorkin, supra note 19 (stating that Thiel spent roughly $10 million financing cases 
against Gawker). 
79 Id.  
80 Id. (stating that Thiel’s motive was “specific deterrence,” referring to Gawker outing 
him, and others, as homosexual). 
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financial risk of litigation is seeking a profitable return on their 
investment.81 
In the Thiel-Gawker situation (and special interest litigation, as 
discussed below), there is no profit motive.  Therefore, a primary motive 
is to influence the defendant in some manner.  Indeed, Thiel stated that 
his motive was “[l]ess about revenge and more about specific 
deterrence,” referring to Gawker publicly outing him and others as 
homosexual.82  Different motives for different actors are not hard to 
imagine, and this same dynamic is not new. 
Financial support of litigation without the intention of financial 
benefit already occurs with pro bono work, legal aid societies, law school 
clinics, and public interest litigators.  How different, then, is Peter Thiel, 
“fund[ing] a team of lawyers to find and help ‘victims’ of the company’s 
coverage mount cases against Gawker,”83 from the likes of the ACLU 
and the NAACP? 84   Further, how different are traditional litigation 
financiers from the likes of Thiel and the ACLU? 
The answers to those questions turn on the different motives of 
each group.  Public interest groups and traditional litigation financiers are 
similar enough that at least one commentator suggests that a litigation 
finance company could organize as a benefit corporation to fund public 
interest litigation brought by the ACLUs and NAACPs of the world.85  
81 Another difference between traditional third-party litigation financing and Thiel is 
that third-party litigation financiers do not appear to seek out clients. Rather, the 
current state of the market seems to be based on litigants applying to the financiers for 
funding arrangements and the financiers processing those requests. However, it is not 
hard to imagine a shift in business strategy by the financier, as plaintiffs’ lawyers do 
some amount of seeking out clients currently. 
82 Id. (stating that Thiel also expressed other motives such as: defending those who 
couldn’t defend themselves, Gawker was a “singularly terrible bully,” and 
“philanthropist.”). 
83 Id. 
84 Special interest groups with a litigation focus are being used because they seem the 
most similar to the situation with Thiel, as opposed to law school clinics or pro bono 
efforts. 
85 See Jason M. Wilson, Litigation Finance in the Public Interest, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 389 
(2014).  
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In such an arrangement, the litigation financier would provide funding in 
return for a share of the proceeds of public interest litigation, thus 
helping traditionally underfunded entities. 86  The for-profit model of 
“Litigation Finance in the Public Interest” ultimately runs aground with 
the reality that most traditional “public interest litigation” (such as racial 
discrimination or environmental claims) “emphasize[s] non-monetary 
relief and symbolic victory over large damage awards.”87  The infeasibility 
of this model fleshes out the different motivations and incentives of the 
two types of entities.  Traditional litigation finance operates for and is 
incentivized by profit whereas traditional public interest groups have a 
cause for which they are fighting.  Because Thiel was not seeking a 
profit, his motivations more closely resemble a public interest group than 
they do a traditional third-party litigation financier.  Both Thiel and 
public interest groups litigate without a profit motive.  This makes the 
initial media reaction to the Gawker case seem overblown and quick to 
rope in the litigation financing industry.  However, as suggested by Mr. 
Wilson in Litigation Finance in the Public Interest, the worlds of litigation 
finance and those seeking to litigate without a profit motive are not so 
distant.88 
If more entities, either individuals or companies, take Thiel’s 
lead, could we enter a new era of using litigation as a sword for 
competition or personal vendettas?  In this scenario, could anything less 
than perfect corporate compliance with laws and regulations mean 
financial ruin? 
As an example in the corporate context, imagine Bank A wants 
to invest $10 million.  Bank A is in competition with Bank B.  Bank A 
knows that Bank B has recently violated a consumer protection statute 
(or maybe they do not).  Furthermore, last year, Bank B provided 
information to a government investigation into the financial system that 
was damaging to Bank A.  Following Thiel’s lead, Bank A spends that 
$10 million on “fund[ing] a team of lawyers to find and help ‘victims’” of 
Bank B “[w]ho otherwise would have accepted a pittance for a 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 422. 
88 Id. 
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settlement . . . .”89  There are an unlimited number of possible iterations 
of what could amount to a “hit-job:” Hedge Fund A shorts Company 
B’s stock and would benefit greatly from a decline in Company B’s stock 
price; Start-Up A is backed by Venture Capital firm B and is in 
competition with Start-Up C; Venture Capital firm B funds a patent 
infringement suit against Start-Up B. 
Companies or individuals could structure their efforts in a 
manner similar to political spending by forming either a benefit 
corporation (actually reap profits from these hit-jobs) or a non-profit.  
For example, a solar panel company (or billionaire entrepreneur-owner 
of a solar panel company) could start an environmentally minded benefit 
corporation that focuses on suing coal, oil, and nuclear power 
companies.  For example, under Delaware’s statute, “A ‘public benefit 
corporation’ is a for-profit corporation organized under and subject to 
the requirements of this chapter that is intended to produce a public 
benefit(s) and to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.” 90 
Further, the corporation’s charter must “[i]dentify within its statement of 
business or purposes . . . 1 or more specific public benefits to be 
promoted by the corporation.” 91   Furthermore, these benefit 
corporations would not have to be sponsored by a sole entity – they 
could solicit investment from any party like any other corporation.  
Fiduciary duties owed to shareholders will affect the expansion 
of “hit-jobs” in the corporate context to a certain extent.  For example, 
consider a situation where a CEO of Company A uses company assets to 
fund a third party’s litigation against a rival Company B.  Is this a 
decision that the board and officers make “in the ordinary course of 
business,” or is this decision an extraordinary transaction that requires 
shareholder approval?  The answer seemingly depends on how the 
hypothetical CEO pursues litigation funding. 
89 Sorkin, supra note 19.    
90 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (West 2015). 
91 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a)(1) (West 2015).  
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Delaware corporations are expressly permitted, among other 
things, to “make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, 
scientific or educational purposes”92  and “[t]ransact any lawful business 
which the corporation’s board of directors shall find to be in aid of 
governmental authority.”93  Corporate charitable donations are reviewed 
on a standard of reasonableness,94 and it is unclear whether or not there 
must be any benefit to the donating corporation.95  Delaware case law 
“recognizes that a court may properly consider any benefit to the 
corporation as an important factor when analyzing the reasonableness of 
a given corporate donation.” 96   Given the low bar presented by a 
“reasonableness” standard, the decision to “charitably” fund a third 
party’s litigation against a rival would be difficult to challenge in court 
from a shareholder’s perspective.97  
If, as discussed above, a corporation structures its funding of a 
third party’s litigation against a rival as “political speech,” then it will be 
even more difficult to learn about, let alone challenge, from a 
shareholder’s perspective. 98   Under existing corporate law, corporate 
decisions to engage in political speech are considered “ordinary business 
decisions,” which is a classification that has several important 
implications.99  First, shareholders “do not have the right to vote directly 
on, or to enact bylaws addressing, the ordinary business decisions of the 
92 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (West 2000). 
93 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(12) (West 2000). 
94 Sullivan v. Hammer, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1621, 1633 (1990). 
95 Steven D. Frankel, The Oracle Cases Settlement: Too Charitable to Ellison and the Plaintiffs’ 
Attorneys?, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 625, 639 (2006). 
96 Id. 
97 There, of course, exist other forms of action such as voting for new directors (if a 
director), voting for new management, and selling the stock. 
98 This article largely omits constitutional discussion of corporate political speech. See 
generally Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that 
the First Amendment protects corporations’ freedom to spend corporate funds on 
indirect support of political candidates); James Bopp, Jr., Joseph E. La Rue & Elizabeth 
M. Kosel, The Game Changer: Citizens United’s Impact on Campaign Finance Law in General 
and Corporate Political Speech in Particular, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 251 (2010). 
99 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 83, 87 (2010). 
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corporation.”100  Second, management may make all corporate political 
speech decisions; there is no requirement under current law that the 
board or independent directors make such decisions.101  Third, ordinary 
business decisions do not require any special disclosures. 102   While 
shareholders have a right to investigate the records of a corporation,103 
there is no guarantee a shareholder will be able to uncover a “smoking 
gun.”104 
Outside of the corporate context, third-party litigation finance 
has taken several different forms through crowdfunding.  Much like 
Peter Thiel, some crowdfunders will receive nothing in return for their 
financial support, and their funding is effectively a donation.  Take, for 
example, the case of Sureshbhai Patel, an Indian citizen who was 
allegedly injured by a police officer in Alabama and left with more than 
$175,000 in hospital bills. 105  In a politically and emotionally charged 
situation, crowdfunding pages started raising money for both Mr. Patel, 
as well as the police officer involved, to cover their legal expenses, 
among other things.106 
Other litigation crowdfunding websites promise a return for 
accredited investors. 107   LexShare is a recently founded litigation 
100 Id. (citing CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232-35 (Del. 
2008)). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2010). 
104 Paul S. Miller, Shareholder Rights: Citizens United and Delaware Corporate Governance Law, 
28 J.L. & POL. 51, 79 (2012) (describing the difficulty shareholders experience in 
protecting their value in a corporation from political spending by management and the 
board). 
105 Jason Silverstein, Indian Man, Alabama Police Officer Who Allegedly Assaulted Him Both 
Get Crowdfunding Campaigns, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Feb. 17, 2015, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/indian-man-alleged-assaulting-
crowdfunding-pages-article-1.2118061. 
106 Id. 
107 See Securities Act of 1933, Regulation D, Rules 501, 505, and 506 (definition of and 
exemption of registration for sale of securities to accredited investor).  
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crowdfunding company offering a wide variety of cases to invest in and 
helping potential crowdfunders with case summaries and a case progress 
tracker.108  While LexShare’s pitch seems to be return on investment, 
trialfunder.com was founded as “a catalyst for change and social justice,” 
specifically funding police brutality cases and promising 15% of any pay 
out. 109   Even foreign companies are getting in on the rush.  
Invest4Justice is a Swiss Verein, located in Geneva, Switzerland that 
provides a platform to invest in lawsuits around the world, including the 
United States.110  Their website promises returns on investment ranging 
from 140% to 4,166.67%.  Notably, there is no requirement that 
investors in lawsuits through the site be “accredited” under SEC rules.111 
The crowdfunding of lawsuits raises a different flavor of the 
same concerns found with traditional third-party litigation financing as 
well as some new ethical concerns that will be addressed below.  For 
instance, concerns about attorney-client privilege only become more 
prominent the more widely dispersed information about the case 
becomes.  Crowdfunding inherently relies on the internet to reach a 
broad base of potential funders.  Websites such as LexShare must strike 
a careful balance between giving investors information to make an 
informed investment decision while also preserving the attorney-client 
privilege.  Crowdfunding litigation also raises concerns about platform 
operators misleading potential investors about the merits of the case.  
Even if the investors are presumed to be sophisticated, platform 
operators generally take a percentage fee of successful funding 
campaigns.  Therefore, platform operators have an incentive to increase 
the flow of funding, which could be done by overstating the merits of 
the case or overstating the potential award.  
Regardless of whether a dedicated third-party litigation financier, 
a slighted billionaire, a corporation, or an internet “crowd” are financially 
backing a litigant, all signs point to the same direction: more money 
108 See https://www.lexshares.com/. 
109  Christopher Coble, Crowdfunding Police Brutality Cases: Justice or Just a Business?, 
FINDLAW (July 8, 2015), http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2015/07/crowdfunding-
police-brutality-cases-justice-or-just-a-business.html (last visited July 27, 2016). 
110 See https://invest4justice.com/terms-use/. 
111 See https://invest4justice.com/campaigns/. 
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being poured into litigation that could service any number of 
motivations.  While some of these funding sources have a profit motive 
to incentivize backing of meritorious cases and efficient settlements, 
others do not.  Are the financiers lacking a profit motive a good or bad 
thing for our legal system?  Are they simply enforcing the law as it is 
written via private means?  Or are these actors showing the wisdom of 
the age-old doctrines of maintenance and champerty? 
V. CURBING PERFECT CIVIL ENFORCEMENT; OR, NEW ETHICAL 
QUESTIONS POSED BY GAWKER-LIKE LITIGATION FINANCING 
 If you buy that Thiel-Gawker-like litigation financing is here to 
stay, the most obvious response from the legal sector will be to define 
what sort of regulations or limitations would be necessary to curb any 
undesirable traits of that type of third-party enforcement of laws.  For 
legal ethicists, the question will be more prescriptive and normative: 
should we want to curb the new perfect civil enforcement market, and if 
so, how?  Generally speaking, if this type of enforcement is a watershed 
moment for our legal economy, what do we want that economy to look 
like in the years ahead?  An even more incisive question is, to paraphrase 
L. Gordon Crovitz’s similar question in the The Wall Street Journal in June 
2016: what happens if the wealthy can fund lawsuits to bankrupt 
companies they dislike?112 
 As we have already noted, Peter Thiel may have answered the 
question for the billionaire class: “[the Gawker suit was] less about 
revenge and more about specific deterrence.”113  Apparently, one of his 
underlying motives was that he wanted to stop Gawker because he 
regarded the media company as a “bully” and a “bad actor” in the field 
of journalism, publishing scandalous details without a social 
conscience.114  In other words, Thiel hoped to finance a message to other 
media companies: do not mess with our personal lives.  Of course, “our” 
must necessarily mean “members of my billionaire or millionaire class” 
112 Crovitz, supra note 1, at A15.  
113 Id. 
114 Ingram, supra note 2.  
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largely because no one else could fund such litigation based on their 
singular motive.  Thiel was effectively sending a message that could be—
and likely was—heard loud and clear by all businesses, not just media 
companies.  
But was Thiel truly seeking public justice in the vein of the 1960s 
public interest litigation model?115  Or was he merely seeking to impose 
his will on a market he disliked to seek profits—whether personal or 
financial?  With the backdrop of maintenance being de-criminalized 
decades ago, perhaps Thiel, in a way, continued that public interest effort 
so that “bully” media companies like Gawker may either stop intruding 
upon the private lives of public personalities or simply stop profiting off 
of scandalous information. 
 If perfect civil enforcement becomes the deterrence that Thiel 
hopes for, many companies and individuals will demand the creation of a 
regulated space for such enforcement.  In the same way that campaign 
finance regulation has drawn intense scrutiny, the next stage of regulated 
modern litigation finance will be born.  What will it look like?  What 
should it look like? 
A. The Ethical Question of Perfect Civil Enforcement 
When he described maintenance, whose de-criminalization 
birthed the modern litigation finance movement, 116  Sir William 
Blackstone wrote that it was “an offense against public justice, as it keeps 
alive strife and contention and perverts the remedial process of the law 
into an engine of oppression.”117  That is, he noted that the prospect of 
engaging in litigation financing was an ethical question.  As far back as 
1850, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that “many acts [that] were 
adjudged to be maintenance [again, at the time, largely illegal] . . . have 
long since ceased to be regarded as morally or legally censurable.” 118  
With Thiel’s high-profile actions against Gawker, have we, as a society, 
115 See supra note 82-83. 
116 See generally supra Part II. 
117 Sherley v. Riggs, 30 Tenn. 53, 54 (1850) (citing 4 Bla. Com. 135); see also Crovitz, 
supra note 1, at A15.  
118 Riggs, 30 Tenn. at 54 (quoting Campbell v. Jones, 4 Wend. 310). 
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pivoted once again?  Those wary of a new age of Thiel-inspired hit jobs 
may request a return of illegal maintenance.  The legal and ethical 
questions are important and made all the more dire by the stakes 
underlying cases like Hogan’s.  Recently, Fortune magazine echoed the 
worried sentiments felt by many when it posed the following question to 
its readers: 
What if Peter Thiel or some other wealthy individuals 
decide that they don’t like the reporting that the New 
York Times has been doing on Syria or gun control or 
marriage equality? There’s no reason to think this kind of 
behavior will be restricted to media outlets that we can all 
agree are reprehensible in some way—the exact same 
machinery could be used against any media entity, and 
their only defense would be to have their own billionaire 
to fight back.119 
This logic is a perfectly understandable extension of thought on the 
fallout from Thiel’s actions, and it may prophesy what will occur in the 
market. 
A pivot in the litigation finance market will require a new 
prescriptive discussion on the regulations, if any, that should accompany 
such a disruptive tactic.  Specifically, any new set of rules and regulations 
intended to preserve the beneficial aspects of the litigation finance 
market while also ameliorating market turmoil will need to focus on a 
new legal ethic surrounding the concept of perfect civil enforcement.  
For example, some free market camps may champion the de-regulated 
nature of litigation finance as an investment or strategic tool; meanwhile, 
opponents of Thiel-like litigation finance decry its effects on companies’ 
free speech. 120  Looking to history, a revised and modern theory of 
maintenance could inform the way we consider the ethical implications 
of litigation financing. 
119 Ingram, supra note 2. 
120 See id.   
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But, as will be discussed below, the ethical questions have a new 
focus after the Thiel-Gawker takedown.  Where once the typical 
regulation of litigation finance protected the unwitting consumer from 
predatory financiers, the Gawker lawsuit prompts questions about 
protecting the market or the businesses themselves from unknown 
financing on the opposite side.  This is, we argue, a completely new way 
of looking at the ethics of litigation finance and its effects on the market 
vis-a-vis a need for regulation. 
The new ethical question posed by perfect civil enforcement 
could first be framed, in our view, in the same vein as the limitations we 
place on malicious prosecutions.  In common law, we generally deem 
prosecutions “malicious” when a civil or criminal prosecutorial team, 
armed with discretion, intentionally and maliciously institutes or pursues 
legal action without adequate justification or for an improper purpose.  
Malicious prosecutions may be brought in civil or criminal matters.121  
For example, in malicious criminal prosecutions, actions may be 
dismissed as malicious when they are egregiously brought without the 
requisite probable cause.  Under Tennessee law, in order to establish 
malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that “(1) the defendant had 
instituted a prior suit or judicial proceeding without probable cause, (2) 
the defendant brought such prior action with malice, and (3) the prior 
action was finally terminated in plaintiff’s favor.”122  Successful malicious 
prosecution actions can award financial compensatory penalties to the 
plaintiff, and they are subject to a one-year statute of limitations similar 
to other personal torts.123 
But by their nature and given the elements that must be proved, 
malicious prosecution actions may come too late to alleviate concerns of 
perfect civil enforcement.  Businesses that wish to strike back against 
unwarranted litigation financed by third parties could file malicious 
prosecution actions, but they would have needed to succeed in the 
121  John Day, Essential Elements of a Malicious Prosecution Claim in Tennessee, DAY ON 
TORTS, http://www.dayontorts.com/miscellaneous-essential-elements-of-a-malicious-
prosecution-claim-in-tennessee.html (last visited July 18, 2016). 
122 Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35, 38 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Christian v. Lapidus, 
833 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tenn. 1992)). 
123 TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(a)(1) (West 2015). 
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lawsuit and discover who, in fact, had financed the plaintiff’s suit.  
Beyond the timing issues, this is a high barrier to entry. 
With regard to the Thiel-Gawker battle, the malicious 
prosecution approach is particularly problematic.  First of all, Gawker 
lost without knowing who was financially backing the suit.  Secondly, 
Gawker’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition was filed June 10, 2016, and 
thus the effects of Hogan’s massive judgment were felt almost 
instantly.124  According to some estimations and based on the lead bid 
for Gawker’s court-mandated auction, Thiel’s actions reduced Gawker’s 
value to $100 million from valuations as high as $250 million prior to the 
Hogan suit. 125   Thus, in a sense, the ship went down almost 
immediately.126  There was certainly no time for successful filing and 
decision on a malicious prosecution action; Florida—the state where the 
Hogan action was based—has malicious prosecution elements akin to 
Tennessee’s.127  If a business tanks within weeks of a malicious judgment 
and its assets are sold at auction (as Gawker intends to do in Chapter 
11), subsequent litigation would not be able to stop the momentum and 
spirit upon which the market bases its valuations.  That is, the price 
investors are willing to pay for a tarnished company will drop 
precipitously, and the thought of correction through litigation will likely 
not recover that lost value.  Gawker lost its value in investors’ minds 
when it lost the Hogan case.  Therefore, when we speak of what can be 
done to curb or limit the effects of perfect civil enforcement, perhaps 
subsequent litigation is not the answer as it would be in wrongful 
prosecutions.  Wrongful prosecution litigation would not address the 
realities of modern litigation financed as displayed in the Gawker lawsuit. 
B. What Can Be Done to Curb the Effects of Perfect Civil Enforcement, If Not 
Subsequent Litigation? 
124 In re Gawker Media, LLC, 16-11700-smb, at Docket No. 1 (June 10, 2016). 
125 Ingram, supra note 2. 
126 Id.  
127 See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1355 (Fla. 1994).  
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Clearly, if subsequent corrective malicious prosecution litigation 
is inadequate to save a precipitous drop in value or complete bankruptcy 
of a tarnished company, then proactive and protective measures must be 
installed to ward off unwarranted market upheaval caused by litigation 
financing.  Perhaps, then, statutes and regulations are the answer.  But 
several questions arise under that scenario.  For example, can regulations 
prove effective at curbing the unwanted effects of litigation financed by 
bad actors?  How would those regulations define the bad actors from 
those protecting legitimate rights or interests? 
At least in Tennessee, one of the first of several states to regulate 
litigation finance, 128  consumer litigation financing has been regulated 
since 2014.129  Although a full discussion of the law is outside the scope 
of this article, the Tennessee Litigation Financing Consumer Protection 
Act “imposes price controls and other measures on lenders that provide 
financial assistance to consumers while they pursue legal settlements.”130  
For example, the law requires litigation financiers to register in 
Tennessee, pay an associated filing fee, and post a surety bond of 
$50,000.131  As added protection, it caps the fees the firm may charge, 
and consumers may also rescind the deal under certain circumstances.  
Writing for the United States Chamber Institute for Legal 
Reform, Lisa A. Rickard wrote in 2014 that the state of Tennessee 
should be lauded for “enact[ing] strong safeguards around a practice that 
shortchanges injured consumers, increases litigation costs, and crowds 
court dockets.”132  This is, of course, in strong contrast to advocates of 
litigation finance that feel the funding practice permits more promising 
128 Victoria Shannon, Third-Party Litigation Funding and the Dodd-Frank Act, 16 TENN. J. 
BUS. L. 15, 18 n. 19 (2014). 
129 Andrew G. Simpson, Litigation Financing Firm Exits Tennessee As New Law Goes Into 
Effect, INS. J. (July 3, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/ 
southeast/2014/07/03/333772.htm (last visited July 20, 2016). 
130 TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-16-101 (West 2014); Id. 
131 TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-16-106 (West 2014); Simpson, supra note 129.  
132 Lisa A. Rickard, Tennessee Enacts Law to Rein in Lawsuit Lending Abuses, U.S. CHAMBER 
INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM (April 30, 2014), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/tennessee-enacts-law-to-rein-in-
lawsuit-lending-abuses (last visited July 20, 2016). 
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plaintiffs access to the courthouse,. 133 but these laws have a different 
focus than that which is needed to curb Thiel-like hit jobs.  Prior to it 
going into effect in July 2014, it was clear that the Tennessee consumer 
protection law was enacted with an eye toward the ethical implications of 
unchecked litigation finance on the consumer-plaintiff, not the market or 
businesses.  
Regulations like Tennessee’s are meant to protect unwitting 
consumers from predatory practices.  These regulations hope that 
plaintiffs in need of strong financial backing do not give up the vast 
majority of the relief sought just because the case was financed by a third 
party.  As noted above, current regulations address the ethical questions 
surrounding third party financiers preying on consumer-plaintiffs.  This 
is a wholly different question than the question of how we can address 
ethical questions surrounding the effects of that litigation financing on 
the market and on businesses like Gawker who may be devastated by the 
right lawsuit. 
C. The Thiel-Gawker Feud Marks an Important Shift in the Ethical Focus of Any 
Litigation Finance Regulation 
The Gawker takedown markedly shifts our view of who might be 
the victim in cases that are financed by third parties.  In Hogan’s case 
specifically, his lawsuit was bankrolled by $10 million of Thiel’s personal 
funds simply as a “deterrence” tactic.134  Thiel did not want to dupe 
Hogan; he wanted to prove a point about media companies like 
Gawker.135  Although it is unclear whether Thiel financially profited from 
the lawsuit,136 Hogan was not put at risk by having his case financed, 
133 See Nichols, supra note 49. 
134 See Crovitz, supra note 1, at A15. 
135 See id. 
136 Sorkin, supra note 19. Sorkin wrote that:  
Without revealing an exact figure, [Thiel] said that estimates of $10 
million in expenses so far were “roughly in the ballpark.” [Thiel] 
added: “I would underscore that I don’t expect to make any money  
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which distinguishes him from the sort of unwitting plaintiffs the 
Tennessee laws hope to protect.  Indeed, Gawker was the party 
victimized in a way by the unknown financing; they were the party who 
would have profited from the existence of some form of regulation, not 
Hogan.  The ethical focus of any litigation finance regulation, then, has 
shifted because of the Thiel-Gawker lawsuit. 
So what type of laws and regulations would be effective?  The 
ethical approach underlying regulations like those that exist to protect 
Tennessee consumers is far from and perhaps difficult to analogize when 
seeking to protect the market and the rights of businesses from a 
billionaire with a grudge.  Public or privately held companies that may 
have strong valuations like Gawker are ostensibly sophisticated and 
arguably do not need regulations that, by protecting plaintiffs acting 
against them, protect the company itself.   Hogan certainly did not need 
regulations’ protection if Thiel, his financier, was only looking to get paid 
in revenge and future deterrence. 
However, the purpose underlying present litigation finance 
regulations are not totally unhelpful.  Despite Gawker being 
sophisticated enough to understand or pay for a proper legal defense, 
they may find themselves as unwitting as the consumers that state laws 
currently protect.  As we now know, Thiel did not disclose his backing 
of the Hogan lawsuit until after the massive judgment had been 
awarded;137 by the same token, Gawker could not know that revenge was 
on the table during settlement discussions.  Gawker, at the time, only 
had a suspicion that someone in Silicon Valley was financing the 
from this. This is not a business venture.” He would not say whether 
he had compensated any of the people, including Mr. Bollea, which 
could raise questions in an appeal. 
Id. Knowing that Thiel is a Stanford-educated lawyer, his eyes are probably 
wide open to conflict of interest issues and therefore likely chose his words 
carefully. 
137  Id.; see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer-turned-entrepreneur admits he financed Hulk 
Hogan’s Gawker suit, ABA JOURNAL (May 26, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/news 
/article/lawyer_turned_entrepreneur_admits_had_financed_hulk_hogans_gawker_suit 
(last visited July 20, 2016). 
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litigation.138  For what it is worth, Hogan himself had never mentioned a 
third-party backer.139 Thus, Gawker could cry foul because it remained 
ignorant and unwitting until the close of the suit.  That is, it did not 
know how much of a victim it was until it was too late.  In relation to 
timing, we have already demonstrated how subsequent malicious 
prosecution litigation is not an effective answer for Thiel-like takedowns.  
Consequently, if laws or regulations are the answer to protecting 
company takedowns by private financiers holding grudges, then those 
laws and regulations must enter the fray as early in the litigation as 
possible.  To put it another way, any efforts to curb unintended market 
consequences on funded lawsuits must come well before the target 
companies’ value hits the rocks. 
D. Some Suggestions to Mold Any Proposed Laws or Regulations 
Because the ethical questions—and indeed, the motivations of 
the parties—underlying Gawker, like deterrence or revenge litigation, 
provide a novel understanding of who requires protection, new 
regulations must be borne with a unique reach.  Again, litigation finance 
regulations protect the consumer-plaintiffs who sign on with third 
parties for financing of their promising suits.  Here, the market may view 
the defendant, Gawker Media, as the victim of litigation finance.  By 
some accounts, shapeless entities such as free speech and the market as a 
whole may ultimately be victimized by the onset of Thiel-like financing.  
If any target business’s civil errors will be noticed and potentially litigated 
(what we have here termed “perfect civil enforcement”) by targeting 
billionaires, company after company could be knocked into bankruptcy.  
Taking a nuanced view of the needs of these companies (and the 
individuals owning and/or running them), we offer a few suggestions to 
138 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Gawker Founder Suspects a Common Financer Behind Lawsuits, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/business/ 
dealbook/gawker-founder-suspects-a-common-financer-behind-lawsuits.html. 
139  See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Peter Thiel Is Said to Bankroll Hulk Hogan’s Suit Against 
Gawker, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/25/business 
/dealbook/peter-thiel-is-said-to-bankroll-hulk-hogans-suit-against-gawker.html.  
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consider when proposing laws or regulations to address these novel 
fears. 
First, although the concept of who may be victimized or require 
protective regulations has shifted, consumers are still in need of 
protection.  Unwitting consumer-plaintiffs will continue to require 
protection from predatory third-party financing even in a climate of fear 
for businesses like Gawker.  Consumer protection laws like Tennessee’s 
should be maintained and enriched alongside any proposed regulation of 
business-defendant-focused scenarios. 
Second, a regulation requiring disclosure of the third-party 
backer would not be burdensome.  Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 7.1, federal litigation already requires as a standard disclosure 
the existence of ownership of a company’s stock before the case 
progresses. 140  If used in all litigation financing scenarios, requiring a 
similar type of disclosure has many benefits beyond simply keeping the 
courts informed about the parties.  For example, disclosing the third-
party financier would allow all parties to properly account for interests in 
settlement negotiations.  As has been reported, Gawker was never aware 
of Thiel’s interests in its settlement negotiations; thus, it could not have 
proposed a remedy that would assuage Thiel’s concerns.141  A proposed 
regulation requiring disclosure could be founded on a percentage basis; if 
the plaintiff expects that a certain percentage, say 15% or more, will be 
funded by outside financiers, then the names of those financiers must be 
disclosed at the outset of the litigation.142  However, if such proposed 
140 See FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1 (requiring the filing of a disclosure statement in federal 
litigation by a nongovernmental corporate party to inform the court with a filing that 
“(1) identifies any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation owning 10% or 
more of its stock; or (2) states that there is no such corporation.”); id. at 7.1(a) (The 
party also has a duty to supplement this information if anything changes.); see also FED. 
R. CIV. P. 7.1(b)(2).  
141 See Crovitz, supra note 1, at A15. 
142 This could operate much the same way as disclosures under Rule 7.1. Although the 
philosophical implications are unclear at this early juncture, the percentage of interest 
surrounding the third-party financiers could be used to affect the plaintiff’s standing. If 
he did not have over a 50%, say, financial interest in the litigation, questions would arise 
under justiciability doctrines. For example, would his injury be truly traceable to the 
defendant? Is it his injury that will be redressed by a favorable decision? Without proper 
standing, of course, the court would lack subject matter jurisdiction in the matter. See 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). 
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quantitative line-drawing would be viewed as encouraging financiers to 
find ways to game the system, mandatory full disclosure of any 
interest—direct or indirect—may be required. 
To remedy financiers entering litigation at an opportune time—
such as when they offer to fund a suit after discovery when the 
likelihood of success is better estimated—the plaintiff will, as in Rule 7.1, 
have a continuing duty to disclose the existence of any such agreements 
or what percentage of the litigation costs (or exact amounts) they expect 
outside sources will pay.143  Failure to disclose or ignoring the continuing 
duty to update the court as to a plaintiff’s funding could be sanctionable 
like a Rule 11 violation.144 
Third, if disclosure (whether full or on some other quantitative 
basis) of a plaintiff’s financiers is viewed as too burdensome, a law 
allowing a flexible standard for the court to apply could be implemented.  
For example, to lessen disagreements on whether certain quantitative 
limits require disclosure of a plaintiff’s financing, courts could utilize a 
more qualitative “compelling interest” approach.  By that standard, upon 
motion by a suspicious party or sua sponte, a court could review materials 
underlying plaintiff’s funding of the lawsuit at hand to determine 
whether a non-party’s compelling interest was present that was not 
disclosed.  If the plaintiff’s ability to settle or make other ends-based 
decisions was significantly affected by the third-party financier(s), the 
court could call for their explicit disclosure to all parties. 
143 See FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1(b) (requiring that the disclosure statement be “promptly” 
supplemented if anything changes). 
144 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. It is also noteworthy in recognizing the potential analogy to 
the discussion here that the disclosures required under Rule 7.1 (along with the 
continuing duty to supplement that disclosure should circumstances change) are 
inspired by the need to disclose conflicts of interest relevant to judges, such as the 
financial interests disclosed pursuant to Canon 3C(1)(c) of the Judicial Code of 
Conduct. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1, Committee Notes; see also FED. R. APP. P. 26.1 
(requiring corporate disclosure statements for the same reasons at the federal appellate 
level). The same types of disclosures of relevant litigation financing information can 
reveal the financial conflicts of interest present in parties’ litigation strategies. The 
disclosures in the litigation financing scenario would be likewise minimal and as 
unburdensome as the Rule 7.1 disclosures are today.  
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Alternatively, laws or regulations requiring disclosure on a 
quantitative basis could accompany a law permitting the courts to review 
the amount of financing as creating (or not creating) a compelling 
interest outside of those presented by the plaintiff.  For example, in 
reference to Hogan’s case against Gawker, if his interests were not 
compatible with Thiel’s, and if Hogan did not have deterrence or 
revenge in mind, then a separate and compelling interest was present in 
the lawsuit.  Hogan would then be required to disclose those interests.  
In theory, the defendant could be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on 
the matter to call witnesses and determine the extent of a third-party 
financier’s effect on a lawsuit.  At the very least, the defendant would be 
able to connect the dots and estimate all of the interests underlying the 
parties’ positions.  Such knowledge would, at a minimum, facilitate 
meaningful settlement negotiations. 
Of course, the downside to these proposed qualitative tests being 
administered by the courts is the “fuzziness” of such a standard and the 
fact that it would create additional and ancillary work for the courts 
beyond the needs of the underlying litigation itself.  Undoubtedly, a body 
of case law would develop around one of these qualitative standards, 
which would needlessly complicate otherwise typical litigation.  And, 
practically speaking, the judiciary—which is already burdened with 
crowded dockets—would likely roll its eyes at constantly administering 
separate rulings on a flexible standard to avoid unwanted abuses in 
litigation financing scenarios.  These concerns would therefore embolden 
support for a full, unqualified disclosure rule in litigation financing, in 
which complete disclosure would be required of any financier with a 
direct or indirect interest in the lawsuit or the lawsuit’s proceeds.  Such 
all-out disclosure should also include disclosure of anyone supplying, 
directly or indirectly, funding to cover any of the costs of litigation, 
including attorneys’ fees. 
No matter the law built to identify it, disclosure of financiers is 
key because it is now clear that the Gawker case has demonstrated the 
importance of knowing the financial backing of opponents.  When a 
business’s survival is at risk, simple disclosure of any third-party 
financiers does not seem unduly burdensome, especially given that so 
many regulations and professional responsibility rules militate against 
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conflicts of interest.  However, consideration of the need for these 
regulations will undoubtedly create heated debate.  Does Main Street 
care about the disclosure of litigation financiers?  Would Americans 
believe that a large, valuable, sophisticated media company like Gawker 
is a “victim” in need of protective laws and regulations?  What if a team 
of billionaires decided to take down PepsiCo in a class action suit that 
arose and refused all settlement offers along the way?  In a burgeoning 
era of the ability of the wealthy to finance any suit against powerful 
companies, the age of perfect civil enforcement could be here to stay. 
Overall, these policy discussions create the larger question: 
should we even seek to, and can Americans stomach, the protection of 
these companies in the first place?  This ethical, political, and economic 
question was drawn into the public discourse during the recent Great 
Recession when “too big to fail” banks were “bailed out” with 
government (or, more precisely, taxpayer) funds.  Should we expect 
more of the same to create a preemptive safety net and a more 
hospitable litigation environment for companies like Gawker?  That 
question, although equally compelling, will have to wait for subsequent 
articles to explore implications of the market as the future of modern 
litigation finance vis-à-vis perfect civil enforcement continues to unfold. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The case of Gawker Media v. Bollea may present a watershed 
moment in the development of modern litigation financing.  Peter Thiel 
played a public interest group by financially backing another plaintiff’s 
case without any incentive to profit from his investment.  However, the 
third-party litigation financing industry got caught in the fray and now 
faces new scrutiny.  The ease with which these two were confused shows 
exactly how muddy the waters have become where third parties get 
financially involved in others’ litigation.  The issues and concerns 
presented largely depend on the specific manifestation whether it be a 
dedicated third-party litigation financier (either sophisticated or not), a 
slighted billionaire, a corporation, or an internet “crowd.”  
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At the very least, Thiel’s lawsuit financing brings to the fore 
various new policy questions about third-party interests in litigation 
moving forward.  As we have discussed in this article, among those 
questions are the financing’s implications for free speech, shifting 
incentives away from profits, professional responsibility, and ethical 
dilemmas surrounding the shift in entities being viewed as potentially 
victimized by wealthy financiers.  Where possible, we have presented 
policy discussions and proposals should regulation be needed of this 
practice, which we believe could be termed a new age of “perfect civil 
enforcement” of the law.  Only time will tell whether these novel legal 
and policy questions will permit a new market where any entity’s mishaps 
can be perfectly enforced by the likes of wealthy financiers with 
questionable or unknown motives. 
